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This book analyses the role of business associations in Latin American tax reforms implemented
during the 1990s and early 2000s. Based on well-established theories of business power (devel-
oped several decades ago by renowned scholars such as Albert Hirschman, Charles Lindblom,
Ralph Miliband, and Wright Mills, among others), Fairﬁeld argues that “when economic elites
have strong instrumental and/or structural power, increasing taxes on income and wealth is dif-
ﬁcult” (p. 53). According to this traditional theory of business power, business interest groups
have two sources of leverage over policymakers: instrumental power and structural power. Instru-
mental power is based on relationships with policymakers (i.e., partisan linkages, institutionalised
consultation, or informal ties) and organizational resources (i.e., organizational cohesion, media
access, or money); meanwhile, structural power stems from the policymakers’ expectations about
the consequences of their policies on investment decisions. Based on this conceptualization of busi-
ness power, Fairﬁeld argues that economic elites in Chile were more successful in imposing their
tax policy preferences because they were better-organized, better-connected, and better-resourced
than their peers in Argentina (and Bolivia), because divestment threats were more credible, and
because Chilean policymakers were particularly cautious of expansive ﬁscal policies. Fairﬁeld also
argues that, although most of the governments in the region had limited capacity to neutralize
business interests, some of them have successfully developed circumventing strategies to weaken
the political inﬂuence of business associations in tax negotiations.
Fairﬁeld supports her argument with carefully gathered qualitative evidence (mostly media re-
ports and interviews) through case studies of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile. The rationale of her
argument is straightforward: after the democratic transition, Chilean business was better orga-
nized around the CPC and better connected with the right-leaning coalition in congress. She
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concludes that Chilean business associations were instrumentally powerful, and consequently, they
were particularly inﬂuential in the policymaking process and successful in neutralizing a number of
revenue-raising initiatives promoted by the governing centre-left coalition between 1994 to 2010.
Additionally, policymakers in post-authoritarian Chile were unwilling to promote unattractive eco-
nomic policies that could harm private investment and macroeconomic stability. According to
Fairﬁeld, these two factors explain why direct taxation is particularly low in Chile and why it was
diﬃcult for Concertación governments to implement progressive tax reforms.
This was not the case in post-authoritarian Argentina, where business interest groups were
less organized, encompassing business associations were weaker, sectoral business associations had
weaker linkages with legislative parties, and their resources for lobbying were less abundant. Fair-
ﬁeld argues that Argentinian business interests were not instrumentally powerful, or at least, they
were less instrumentally powerful than their Chilean peers. Furthermore, politicians and policy-
makers were not particularly concerned about macroeconomic stability or protecting direct private
investments. The Argentinian economy was more diversiﬁed than the Chilean economy, and capi-
tal mobility seemed less threatening. Therefore, the high level of fragmentation among the Argen-
tinian economic elites and the relative low importance of disinvestment threats made it easier for
Peronist governments to raise direct tax revenues over the past two decades. For the case of Bo-
livia, Fairﬁeld draws more nuanced conclusions than the previous two cases. Business associations
in Bolivia were rather weakly institutionalized (regionally fragmented business organization, weak
or unstable partisan linkages, and ineﬀectual channels with policymakers), rendering them less ca-
pable of inﬂuencing the political agenda. But most importantly, business power was eﬀectively
counterbalanced by constant and credible threats of massive popular mobilization.
Fairﬁeld’s book makes a crucial contribution to the study of business and tax politics in Latin
America. Her argument is quite straightforward and convincing, and the evidence presented is
extensive and carefully crafted (especially in the case of Chile; the chapter on Bolivia is less ex-
haustive). Fairﬁeld’s book oﬀers a proﬁcient description of the political conﬂict behind a number
of recent tax reform initiatives in Latin America, highlight diﬀerent sources and dimensions of
business power, and analyses its consequences for tax policy in the region. The examples selected
give the reader a good sense of the political interaction between economic elites, business-friendly
legislative parties, and government oﬃcials. They also illustrate the salience of tax issues for voters
and public opinion.
However, this book does not provide a forceful theory about the political and institutionalmech-
anisms that translate business power into policy outcomes. How does business power oppose gov-
ernment’s tax policy preferences? Fairﬁeld provides some clues about their strategies and about
the government’s methods to circumvent business opposition, but this book does not elucidate
the interaction between government and business in the policymaking arena. The disproportion-
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ate focus on business power does not allow us to completely understand the role of government
oﬃcials and technocrats in the policymaking game, and it downplays the dynamic relationship be-
tween economic elites and politicians. Fairﬁeld herself recognizes that party politics matters and
the president’s tax policy preferences are not only a function of business power (policymakers’ tax
preferences can also be quite responsive to public opinion even in contexts where business are quite
powerful – e.g. Pinera’s 2012 tax reform). Nevertheless, this book only provides a cursory discus-
sion of the eﬀects of partisanship, the dynamics of coalition building in congress, and the distinct
but entwined roles of the president and business in crafting those coalitions to change tax policy.
In summary, Fairﬁeld makes an important contribution to the ﬁeld’s understanding of instru-
mental and structural business power (the evidence presented on instrumental power is far more
convincing than that of structural power) and their possible correlation with tax policy outcomes in
Latin America. However, more research needs to be done to develop a causal theory on the mech-
anisms that translate business power into political inﬂuence and speciﬁc tax policies. Such a theory
would require us to proportionately focus on both business and policymakers, and understand the
dynamics of the political bargaining between them.
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